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Abstract 
This paper addresses the difficulties of accurately defining a SWF, discusses the evolution of the original 
SWFs from stabilization to wealth funds, and examines how SWFs are organized and funded. We also 
detail the key measures developed to assess the operational and informational transparency and 
institutional quality of different fund by scomparing the organizational structures, corporate governance 
systems, and investment patterns observed for SWFs with those documented empirically for other 
internationally active institutional investors.  
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The economic role of governments has, of course, been evolving rapidly over the past several 
decades. States have always and everywhere regulated private businesses to a greater or lesser degree, but 
many also chose to enter business as owners. Mostly from the Great Depression onwards, governments 
around the world launched (or nationalized) companies that produced goods and services sold to the 
nation’s populaces, often under monopolistic regimes [Shleifer (1998), Megginson (2005)]. As these 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) spread and citizens experienced the often poor quality of their output, 
disillusion with SOEs prompted governments to adopt a new policy of privatization. Since its introduction 
by Britain’s Thatcher government in the early 1980s to a then-skeptical public, privatization now appears 
to be accepted as a legitimate—often a core—tool of statecraft by many of the world’s over 190 national 
governments. Since 1977, governments around the world have raised over $2.5 trillion by selling state-
owned enterprises to private investors and corporations [Megginson (2013)].  
The historic rise of privatization as a core state policy has thus been well documented. As noted, 
what is far less well known is the frequency with which governments have been buying equity in listed 
and unlisted private firms. Contrary to public perceptions and despite the worldwide success of state 
privatizations, over the 2001-2012 period governments acquired more assets through stock purchases 
($1.52 trillion) than they sold through share issue privatizations and direct sales ($1.48 trillion).1 Much of 
this state investment was channeled through SWFs and, as we describe in detail below, the vast bulk of 
these stock purchases have been cross-border transactions.  
In many ways, this surge is government stock investment is puzzling, since a huge volume of 
published research on government ownership documents dramatic performance improvements for 
privatized enterprises, suggesting that states should be reducing their ownership of corporate equity, 
rather than increasing it. A large segment of this research, summarized in Shirley and Walsh (2001), 
Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Murrell (2002), Sun and Tong (2003), and Estrin, Hanousek, 
Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009), suggests that governments are usually bad operating managers and that 
firm performance improves with privatization, while another stream of literature has looked at “mixed 
ownership” firms [Boardman and Vining (1989); Shirley and Walsh (2001); Lin and Su (2008); Borisova, 
Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev (2012)], generally finding that mixed ownership also has a negative 
impact on firm value. The world has thus been witnessing two powerful, simultaneous, and apparently 
contradictory economic phenomena over recent years: continuing sales of state-owned assets and 
enterprises to private investors by some governments, coupled with increasingly large purchases of 
private, often listed, corporate equity by other governments.  
                                                          
1 Reported in Megginson (2013, Figure 3), based on data from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A database 
and Privatization Barometer (http://www.privatizationbarometer.net). During 2013, state asset sales (privatizations) 
reverted to the pre-2001 historical pattern, exceeding state purchases by more than $50 billion.   
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The key innovation that explains these apparent contradictions is that the recent government 
purchases of equity have been conducted mostly by state entities acting as investors rather than owners, 
buying non-controlling stakes in foreign and domestic companies in order to realize a long-term financial 
return, rather than to own and operate these businesses as state enterprises. This phenomenon can be 
called the rise of the fiduciary state, and sovereign wealth funds are the single most important expression 
of this force, as, over the past decade, their total assets have grown to exceed those of hedge funds and 
private equity combined. What makes this phenomenon especially important, and perplexing, is the 
aforementioned fact that most government equity purchases have been acquisitions in foreign companies, 
where the state purchaser cannot exercise any sovereign regulatory or supervisory power. These state 
shareholders have no more authority to monitor target firm managers than do private investors—and may 
well have less ability to do so, if they are politically constrained from being too pushy.   
Two economic phenomena have promoted the growth of SWFs since 1999. The first is the 
massive accumulation of foreign (mostly dollar-denominated) official reserves by central banks that was 
prompted by the devastating 1997–98 East Asian financial crisis. As Figure 1 shows, governments have 
built up increasingly massive foreign exchange reserve holdings over the past fifteen years—reaching 
$12.338 trillion at year-end 2012, according to the World Bank—and this has prompted them to reallocate 
some assets to SWFs, to seek a commercial return without having to convert out of dollars. The second 
major force fueling the recent growth of SWFs has been the nearly inexorable rise in the world price of 
oil, which, as Figure 3 shows, increased from barely $10 per barrel in 1998 to over $148 a decade later, 
before stabilizing between $90–110 per barrel since 2010.  
**** Insert Figure 1 about here **** 
As discussed more fully in the following section, all of the largest SWFs receive their funding 
either from transfers of oil (and natural gas) revenues earned by national energy companies or from 
transfers of excess foreign exchange reserves earned from exports and managed by the national central 
bank or Treasury. For this reason, SWFs are referred to as either “oil based” or “trade surplus based,” and 
we will follow that nomenclature throughout this survey. However, we also stress another important 
method of classifying SWFs, which our reading of the empirical evidence suggests may in fact be even 
more relevant for explaining their investing behavior, operating philosophy, and how they are received by 
nations targeted for SWF investment— whether the funds are sponsored by democratic or non-democratic 
nations and, closely related, whether the funds operate in a transparent or non-transparent manner.2 We 
                                                          
2 Other researchers have classified SWFs in different ways. A common alternative is to classify funds according to 
the purpose for which they were launched. This approach is summarized in Bortolotti (2013), distinguishing 
between inter-generational saving funds, aimed at investing incomes gained from harvesting finite resources such as 
oil and gas, funds aimed at diversifying national reserves, and funds aimed at economic development.   
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further note that there is tremendous heterogeneity among funds, and thus any attempt to neatly “classify” 
SWFs should be viewed with caution.    
The overarching question/theme we address in this survey is whether SWFs are fundamentally 
different in organization, behavior, and/or investment objectives from other types of large, internationally 
active institutional investors that are operated by or for private owners [Chen, Harford, and Li (2007); 
Ferreira and Matos (2008); Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009); Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos 
(2011)]. The answer to this question should guide all optimal public policy and financial valuation 
responses to the rise of SWFs. On one hand, SWFs resemble other internationally active investment 
vehicles such as pension funds, buy-out funds, and mutual funds that have been extensively researched by 
financial economists. SWFs are particularly similar in structure and expressed objectives to hedge funds, 
as described by Klein and Zur (2009); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008); and Becht, Franks, 
Mayer, and Rossi (2009), in that SWFs are also stand-alone, unregulated pools of capital, managed by 
investment professionals, which often acquire large equity stakes in publicly traded companies. If SWFs 
are really just large, commercially minded financial investors, there is no compelling reason to establish 
regulatory barriers to their inward investments, demand greater disclosures from them than from other 
investors, or assess their financial performance any differently than one would a private institutional 
investor. However, if SWFs are inherently different because of their state ownership, as Truman (2008, 
2011) and others suggest, then these funds will inevitably be viewed and regulated differently than other 
large institutional investors. 
This survey is structured as follows. Section 1 addresses the difficulties of accurately defining a 
SWF, discusses the evolution of the original SWFs from stabilization to wealth funds, and examines how 
SWFs are organized and funded. Section 2 describes how SWFs are organized and operated, and details 
the key measures developed to assess the operational and informational transparency and institutional 
quality of different funds. This section concludes by comparing the organizational structures, corporate 
governance systems, and investment patterns observed for SWFs with those documented empirically for 
other internationally active institutional investors, both state-owned and private. Section 3 concludes and 
points to issues that future researchers sorely need to address. 
 
1. What are Sovereign Wealth Funds, and Why do We Care? 
There is no consensus, in either the academic or practitioner literature, on exactly what constitutes 
a sovereign wealth fund. While SWFs are a heterogeneous group, most of the larger and more established 
SWFs evolved from funds set up by governments with revenue streams dependent on the value of one 
underlying commodity and who wished to diversify investments to stabilize revenues. Accordingly, most 
SWFs have been established in countries that are rich in natural resources, with oil-related SWFs being 
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the most common and largest group. These include the funds sponsored by the Arab Gulf countries, 
Russia and the ex-Soviet republics, Malaysia, Brunei, and Norway. A newer set of funds has recently 
been established in response to discoveries of major new resource endowments—particularly natural gas, 
but also oil, coal, diamonds, copper, and other minerals. A second important group of SWFs includes 
those financed out of accumulated foreign currency reserves resulting from persistent and large net 
exports, especially the funds based in Singapore, Korea, China, and other East-Asian exporters.  
Because definitions vary and because few funds have disclosed key organizational details, 
heterogeneous funds are often grouped into the SWF category, even though there are significant 
differences between funds with respect to organizational structure (separately-incorporated holding 
companies versus pure state ministries), investment objectives (preservation of wealth versus wealth 
diversification and growth), compensation policies and status of fund managers (incentivized 
professionals versus fixed-wage bureaucrats), and degree of financial transparency (Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund-Global and Australia’s Future Fund versus almost all other large funds).  
Most definitions of SWFs suggest these are state-owned investment funds (not operating 
companies) that make long-term domestic and international investments in search of commercial returns.3 
Some definitions are broader than this, as in Truman (2008), who defines a sovereign wealth fund as “a 
separate pool of government-owned or government-controlled financial assets that includes some 
international assets.” Consistently, Balding (2008) shows that an expansive definition encompassing 
government-run pension funds, development banks, and other investment vehicles would yield a truly 
impressive total value of “sovereign wealth.”4  
In this survey, we use the definition of a sovereign wealth fund employed by the Sovereign 
Investment Lab: (1) an investment fund rather than an operating company; (2) that is wholly owned by a 
sovereign government, but organized separately from the central bank or finance ministry to protect it 
from excessive political influence; (3) that makes international and domestic investments in a variety of 
risky assets; (4) that is charged with seeking a commercial return; and (5) which is a wealth fund rather 
than a pension fund—meaning that the fund is not financed with contributions from pensioners and does 
                                                          
3 In addition, most definitions exclude funds directly managed by central banks or finance ministries, as these often 
have very different priorities, such as currency stabilization, funding of specific development projects, or the 
development of specific economic sectors.  
4 In ongoing research employing the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions 
database and other databases, we identify over 12,100 investments, worth over $1.67 trillion, just in listed-firm 
stocks by state-owned investment companies, stabilization funds, commercial and development banks, pension 
funds, and state-owned enterprises. If we add state purchases of government and corporate bonds, plus SWF 
holdings and foreign exchange reserves of roughly $12 trillion, the total value of state-owned financial assets may 
already exceed $25 trillion. David Marsh writes that global public investors now own about $30 trillion of assets 
worldwide. See David Marsh, “Sovereign-wealth funds must move out of shadows,” MarketWatch (March 10, 2014, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sovereign-wealth-funds-must-move-out-of-shadows-2014-03-10). 
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not have a stream of liabilities committed to individual citizens.5 While this sounds clear-cut, ambiguities 
remain. Several funds headquartered in the United Arab Emirates are defined as SWFs, even though these 
are organized at the emirati rather than the federal level, because the emirates are the true decision-
making administrative units.6 Table 1 presents the 33 SWFs that meet these criteria, the countries that 
sponsor the funds, their year of inception, their principal source of funds, and estimates of the current 
value of assets under management (AUM). We also include Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 
this listing, since the Saudi government announced in June 2014 that it would establish a large SWF, 
partly encompassing SAMA’s foreign assets. 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
There is some controversy regarding which is the largest SWF. Historically, the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (ADIA) has been awarded that title, but that was mostly because the fund has never 
reported its assets under management, and commentators assumed that Abu Dhabi’s massive oil export 
revenues must translate into an equally massive fund, with AUM estimates often exceeding $800 billion. 
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimates that ADIA has AUM of about $773 billion, which places 
it second in size behind Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global. The GPFG is growing very rapidly 
and has reported AUM of $840.8 billion as of March 17, 2014. If the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency is 
re-classified as a SWF, it will be third largest, with foreign assets of $663.3 billion, but the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC, AUM of $575.2 billion at year-end 2012) is now the third largest SWF, as 
defined by the Sovereign Investment Laboratory. Significantly smaller is fourth-ranked Kuwait 
Investment Authority (KIA, estimated AUM of $410.0 billion), which is also the oldest SWF having been 
founded in 1953.7 Amazingly, the small city state of Singapore itself sponsors the fifth and sixth largest 
SWFs, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC, estimated AUM of $285.0 billion), 
which is charged primarily with international investing, and Temasek Holdings (AUM of $173.3 billion 
as of March 31, 2013), which focuses on domestic and regional investments. The United Arab Emirates 
alone accounts for six of the 33 SWFs on this list, and other Arabian Gulf states account for another four. 
Only four funds are from western-style democracies (Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland), though 
                                                          
5 For a comparison of SWFs with state-run pension funds, see Blundell-Wignall, Hu, and Yermo (2008).They 
conclude that SWFs and public pension reserve funds (PPRFs) are similar in some ways, but differ significantly 
with respect to objectives, investment strategies, sources of financing, and transparency requirements.   
6 The sub-national UAE funds included are the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (the world’s second-largest SWF), 
the Investment Corporation of Dubai, Istithmar World, the Mubadala Development Company, the International 
Petroleum Investment Corporation (IPIC), and the Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority. 
7 The Kuwaiti SWF is also unusual among large funds in that it is funded based on a formulaic percentage of the 
sales of Kuwait National Oil Company. The fund is automatically granted 10% of the oil revenues of the state, and 
the finance ministry recently approved increasing the allocation to 25%. See Henny Sender, Kuwait Investment 
Authority: Integrity and caution are no handicap, Financial Times (April 24, 2013). 
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many others are sponsored by countries meeting most definitions of being democratic (Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Russia).8 No fewer than 19 of the 33 funds have been launched since January 2000.  
The eighteen SWFs that are financed principally from oil revenues have combined AUM of 
$3.228 trillion, or about 68 percent of the $4.756 trillion total for all funds, while trade-surplus-financed 
SWFs account for most of the rest. It should be noted that this fairly restrictive definition of SWFs yields 
a smaller number and total AUM value than do most other classifications. For example, the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute lists 64 SWFs with AUM of $6.357 trillion in March 2014. However defined, these 
funds have been growing much more rapidly over the past several years than have hedge funds, pension 
funds, and other private institutional investors.  
1.1. The Historical Evolution of SWFs—From Stabilization to Financial Investor 
Most of the well-established SWFs evolved in some way from commodity stabilization fund 
precursors. The main purpose of a stabilization fund is to offset revenue declines due to falling 
commodity prices or production levels, and most such funds are employed by countries whose budgets 
are highly dependent on natural resources, such as oil, copper, diamonds, or other commodities. A large 
portion of the existing literature regarding commodity stabilization funds has focused on their efficiency 
and on the related size question—that is, on whether current stabilization funds are under- or over-
capitalized.9 As Balding (2012) discusses in detail, the early pre-1980s stabilization funds often suffered 
from poor management and from the constant danger of politicians succumbing to the temptation to 
promote excessive domestic spending. A significant evolution was marked by the Chicago School 
economists charged with reforming the Chilean economy in the mid-1980s, who established the Chilean 
Social and Economic Stabilization Fund in 1985 with partial funding from the World Bank. The fund 
incorporated many of the characteristics of a modern SWF and, importantly, benefited from an 
independent board setting target levels of accruals and withdrawals, with the goal of minimizing political 
interference with the fund and thus restraining public spending. The subsequent success of the Chilean 
fund led the World Bank to advise other states to replicate this model. While the evolution from 
stabilization funds to SWFs was thus a gradual process, Balding (2012) notes that stabilization funds aim 
at promoting local development (by smoothing spending booms and busts related to volatile commodity 
prices), while SWFs aim at financial returns. As a consequence, stabilization funds tend to invest 
                                                          
8 It is perhaps no surprise that so many oil-funded SWFs are from non-democratic countries, since it is well 
established that abundant oil reserves (which promote large SWFs) and the evolution of democratic societies are 
natural enemies. Tsui (2009) finds that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil (approximately the initial endowment of 
Iraq) pushes a country’s democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades. Wolf and 
Pollitt (2008) and Wolf (2009) also show clearly that national oil companies are significantly less efficient and 
innovative than privately-owned international oil companies—and thus document the scale of value-destruction 
associated with state ownership/control of petroleum reserves and production. 
9 Commodity stabilization funds are discussed and analyzed in Arrau and Claessens (1992) while the U.S. 
equivalent, state “rainy day” funds, are described in Douglas and Gaddie (2002).   
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domestically, while SWFs attempt to diversify revenue streams by investing mostly abroad. In part, this 
foreign focus is also a result of governments using SWFs to reinvest commodity-originated funds abroad, 
perhaps to prevent the local currency from appreciating and, in general, to avoid what has come to be 
known as “Dutch disease”—or an overheating of the local economy that could hurt the development of 
other, non-commodity, sectors.10 Yet we need to recognize that many of the modern SWFs, implicitly or 
explicitly, carry at least a partial stabilization mandate, as the domestic financial-sector recapitalizations 
seen in 2008 and 2009 attest. As we have seen, the consensus in SWF-related corporate and institutional 
research is that much of the growth in SWFs will originate from a reallocation of assets from stabilization 
funds; accordingly, the issue of optimal size of stabilization funds is very relevant to the overall 
discussion of SWFs.  
While the older SWFs evolved out of stabilization funds, those established since 2000 were 
mostly created as de novo SWFs, even though the term itself had not yet been coined in many cases. 
However created, SWFs grew quietly but steadily until 2005. Since the start of 2006, SWF total AUM 
have grown very rapidly, due to a shift in world trading patterns and the large rise in world oil prices that 
fueled dollar-denominated surpluses for mostly Asian countries running large trade surpluses and oil 
exporters in the Arabian Gulf, Asia and Europe. As noted in the Introduction, Andrew Rozanov coined 
the term “sovereign wealth fund” in 2005, which caught on slowly but inexorably.11   
1.2. The Evolving Political Response to Cross-Border SWF Investments  
SWFs first entered popular discourse during early 2007, when the newly-formed China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) purchased a $3 billion, non-voting equity stake in Blackstone Group 
immediately prior to the group’s highly touted (but subsequently under-performing) initial public 
offering. Later that same year, and again in early 2008, SWFs surged to the forefront of financial policy 
discussions when several, mostly Arabian Gulf-based SWFs effectively rescued the western banking 
system by purchasing some $60 billion worth of newly issued stock in large American and European 
banks at the height of the subprime mortgage crisis. In total, SWFs invested almost $90 billion in the 
stock of U.S. and European financial institutions between July 2005 and October 2008, and CIC injected 
an additional $40 billion into recapitalizing two Chinese state-owned banks in late 2007 and 2008. These 
funds have thus collectively invested more new capital into the world’s financial institutions recently than 
any other single entity except the entire United States government.  
                                                          
10 We thank Matthias Van Rendenborgh for his discussion on the topic. Kalter and Schena (2013) offer an in-depth 
analysis of emerging market economies needing to balance SWF asset growth, domestic development, and the risks 
related to recycling SWF assets domestically.  
11 The slow take-up of “sovereign wealth fund” is illustrated by noting that the Financial Times first used the term 
on May 17, 2007, two years after Rozanov’s article was published. Once the phrase reached a critical mass of 
usage—and the FT began employing the term—usage quickly became universal, to the point where a search of the 
Financial Times website (www.ft.com) on March 26, 2014 yielded 5,607 hits for “sovereign wealth fund”.   
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These episodes highlighted both the sheer financial firepower of SWFs and just how dependent 
on them western financial economies had become, and vice versa [Kunzel, Lu, Petrova, and Pihlman 
(2011); Bolton, Samama, and Stiglitz (2012)]. Early comments by public officials and analyses in the 
popular press tended to be very hostile towards SWFs, emphasizing perceived problems associated with 
their growth.12 Political opposition to SWFs was exemplified by German Chancellor Angela Merkel who, 
in June 2007, publicly complained about Russian SWFs buying pipelines and energy infrastructure in 
Europe, and by a surge of discussions regarding SWFs in the U.S. Congress.  
The issues raised by the early critics of SWFs included: (1) the possibility that their capital could 
be used to further political purposes and to acquire stakes in strategic industries; (2) the risk of equity 
price bubbles due to the sheer size of their investments and the related decline in demand for Treasury 
bonds; (3) the risk of an increase in volatility of financial markets; (4) the possibility that SWFs might 
have a detrimental effect on corporate governance because of political motives or lack of sophistication; 
and (5) the risk of the emergence of a new form of financial protectionism as a reaction to SWFs. The 
criticism most often mentioned was (6) the lack of transparency by SWFs—and this is one criticism that 
lingers to the present day. There was also great concern (7) that SWFs were growing at what appeared to 
be an exponential rate. By far the most important fear regarding SWFs was, and to some extent remains, 
(8) that as state-owned funds they would not act as strictly commercially-minded investors, seeking only 
the highest possible financial return, but would instead be forced to invest strategically by home-country 
governments seeking political influence or access to foreign technology. Most of these fears have proven 
groundless, as there have been no major documented cases of SWFs investing abroad as political agents 
of home-country governments; quite the reverse—SWFs have proven to be passive and non-
confrontational with target firm managers almost to a fault. As foreign, state-owned investment funds, 
any posture that SWFs take other than being purely passive investors might generate political pressure or 
a regulatory backlash from recipient-country governments (Dinç and Erel, 2013).13 Even when SWFs do 
take majority stakes—which Miracky, Dyer, Fisher, Goldner, Lagarde, and Piedrahita (2008) show occurs 
almost exclusively when SWFs invest in domestic companies—the funds rarely seem to challenge 
incumbent managers [Mehropouya, Huang, and Barnett (2009)]. English, Smythe, and McNeil (2004) and 
Woitdke (2002) find similar behavior by U.S. public-sector pension funds and by California Public 
                                                          
12 See Lawrence Summers, “Sovereign wealth funds shake the logic of capitalism,” Financial Times, July 30, 2007; 
Steven R. Weisman, “Concern about ‘sovereign wealth funds’ spreads to Washington,” International Herald 
Tribune, August 20, 2007, and Krishna Guha, “Warning over sovereign wealth funds,” The Financial Times, June 
22, 2007.   
13 Active foreign government involvement in a domestic target is usually met with significant public opposition, and 
so governments often choose to be passive investors, especially in their foreign holdings. Prabakhar (2009), Masters 
(2013), and Jackson (2014) all show that involvement of a foreign state-owned entity in a large acquisition of a US 
company is certain to prompt scrutiny by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).   
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Employee Retirement System (CalPers) managers, respectively. More positively, SWFs provided 
invaluable liquidity to both global and domestic capital markets during the Financial Crisis of 2008-09. 
Today, most governments actively court SWF investment, with Britain being the most successful by far.  
1.3. Countries Proposing or Launching SWFs Recently 
Despite the ambiguous political reaction to SWFs in the West, and notwithstanding the meager 
empirical evidence supporting their effectiveness (which we survey in section 4), many countries have 
launched or proposed new funds in recent years. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI) reports that 
32 SWFs were created between 2005 and 2012, and that there were about 70 funds in existence in 
October 2013 with assets of nearly $5.5 trillion.14 Table 2 describes 26 new SWFs that have been 
announced since January 2008. In most cases, the funds were proposed immediately after a major new 
natural resource reserve was discovered, or when administration of an existing resource base was 
restructured. Examples of countries that proposed or established a SWF after a new resource was proven 
include Brazil, Israel, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia. These governments respectively proposed new 
SWFs after large oil deposits were discovered off Brazil’s coast by Petrobras; after two immense natural 
gas fields were proven within Israel’s Mediterranean territory; in anticipation of windfall payments—that 
ultimately might exceed 10 times Papua New Guinea’s annual GNP—from a newly-built liquefied natural 
gas export project; and after mining concessions were granted to foreign companies to develop 
Mongolia’s huge new mineral deposits. Much the same experience motivated the governments of Ghana, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania to propose new SWFs after new natural resource bases were proven. 
Greenland and Lebanon showed even greater anticipation, and proposed new SWFs after likely new 
natural gas fields in their territories were identified, but before their full commercial potential was even 
proven.  
Angola, Chile, Iran, Nigeria, and Russia all launched new or restructured SWFs as a way to 
change how an existing stream of royalty payments would be administered. The stated rationales varied; 
Angola and Nigeria set up new funds to increase transparency and ensure that the nation’s resource 
wealth would not be misappropriated; Iran set up a fund to help it circumvent international sanctions; and 
Chile and Russia re-oriented existing funds more towards making international investments.  
A third common motivation for launching a SWF has been to allow “excess” foreign exchange 
reserves held by the central bank to be channeled away from static holdings of low-yielding sovereign 
(usually U.S. government) bonds and into higher-return equity and corporate debt investments. This 
impulse to “sweat” excess reserves motivated the governments (or at least governing parties) of India, 
Japan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa to propose new SWFs. 
                                                          
14 These aggregate SWF data are from Javier Blas, “Protecting Nigeria oil SWF is no easy task,” Financial Times 
(October 10, 2013). The recent surge in setting up African SWFs is described in Triki and Faye (2011).  
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Three patterns stand out regarding all of the instances of new and proposed SWFs described 
above. First, these governments usually proposed setting up a wealth fund to preserve and protect new 
monetary inflows, rather than using the new monies to launch spending programs or to channel windfall 
funds through existing state-owned financial entities. Relatedly, all these proposals reflect a strong desire 
to ensure that new resource flows would be channeled through a transparent, accountable, and 
professionally managed investment company rather than through existing—and often quite corrupt—state 
investment vehicles or state-owned banks.15 Third, almost without exception, these new funds are being 
modeled after Norway’s GPFG with respect to organizational design, transparency and managerial 
professionalism, and investment preference for listed shares and bonds of international companies.   
 
2. How are Sovereign Wealth Funds Organized and Operated? 
All modern governments play leading roles in their nations’ economic affairs, and they conduct 
direct financial interventions through a wide range of entities. At one extreme are official state ministries, 
such as the Treasury and the Finance Ministry, while at the other extreme are legally separate, 
individually incorporated state owned enterprises (SOEs) through which states exert influence as the 
controlling shareholder. In between these organizational poles lie regulatory agencies, boards and 
commissions (such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Social Security 
Administration); state-owned but separately capitalized commercial and development banks (such as 
Brazil’s BNDES and Germany’s KfW); and, most important of all, central banks, which are integrated 
organs of government, even when granted substantial operating autonomy. There is a wide variation in 
the degree to which these institutions are under the direct political control of the national government, 
how much operational discretion the entity’s managers exercise, and even whether the entity’s workers 
are state employees with civil service protection or are part of the private-sector workforce.  
As described in Das, Lu, Mulder, and Sy (2009); Jain (2009); and Al-Hassan, Papaioannou, 
Skancke, and Sung (2013), governments wishing to set up a SWF must confront all of these 
organizational, ownership, and personnel issues, beginning with the optimal degree of separation between 
the new SWF and the existing central bank and Finance Ministry. Stabilization funds and foreign 
exchange reserve management groups tend to be fairly tightly bound within existing entities, but when 
these funds evolve into SWFs most governments deliberately separate them—either legally or 
                                                          
15 The existing evidence examining the performance of state-owned investment vehicles is indeed quite damning. In 
particular, their investments in target firms’ are generally found to be associated with lower target firm valuations 
[Jiang, Lee, Yue (2010); Lin, Ma, Malatesta, Xuan (2011)]. State-owned banks have also been documented to act 
and lend differently than do privately owned banks, and this generally is associated with poor aggregate economic 
performance and value reductions at specific target firms [LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2001); Sapienza 
(2004);  Brown and Dinç (2005); Dinç (2005); Morck, Yavuz, Yeung (2010); Houston, Lin, Ma (2011); Gropp, 
Hakenes, Schnabel (2011);  Bailey, Huang, Yang (2011); Karolyi and Taboada (2011); Mohsi and Otchere (2013); 
and Iannotta, Nocera, Sironi (2013)]. 
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operationally, or both—from other ministries and agencies in order to shield the funds’ managers from 
direct political pressure. There is, however, great variation between countries in how effectively SWFs 
are shielded from politics, and this is especially problematic for funds based in non-democratic countries 
and kingdoms. At one extreme lies Norway’s GPFG, wherein investment policy is set by an independent 
board of experts based on strategic guidelines established by the nation’s legislature (Towner 2013). The 
fund’s managers are fully protected from partisan political pressures, even though the fund is 
administered by Norges Bank (the central bank). At the other extreme (among large funds) lie Abu 
Dhabi’s ADIA and Singapore’s Government Investment Company, both of which report only to the 
nation’s rulers and refuse to disclose even such basic information as total AUM. Other funds fall 
somewhere in between with respect to reporting lines of authority and mandated levels of disclosure. 
Figure 4 presents a stylized representation of how a new fund might be organized, funded, staffed, and 
operated. The nation’s culture and political philosophy will be expressed through decisions regarding 
each variable in this flow diagram. Open, democratic societies typically establish funds through explicit 
legislation, endow them with financing from a dedicated revenue source, provide specific operating and 
investment objectives, mandate high standards of employee professionalism and information disclosure, 
and frequently also give them a mandate to invest ethically (Dimson, Karakaş, and Li, 2013). Less 
democratic societies make different choices at these margins when establishing their funds, with varying 
emphasis being placed depending on the goals of the sponsoring regime.  
**** Insert Figure 4 about here **** 
2.1. The Internal Governance and Staffing of SWFs – Why it Matters 
A key fact about all the larger SWFs is that they tend to have very small staffs, even though many 
funds control assets worth more than $100 billion. Norway’s GPFG, China’s CIC, and Abu Dhabi’s 
ADIA collectively have fewer than 3,000 employees, yet have combined AUM of over $1.1 trillion. In 
comparison, privately-owned Fidelity Investments manages a comparable amount of its clients’ assets, 
but employs 38,000 people. These meager SWF staffing levels have two important implications for fund 
operations and investment management. First, most large funds employ numerous external managers to 
actually invest the funds’ money and oversee segments of their portfolios, as described in Clark and 
Monk (2009), Dixon and Monk (2013), and Al-Kharusi, Dixon and Monk (2014).16 As in many other 
areas, Norway’s GPFG and ADIA represent polar examples of this tendency. Since GPFG follows an 
almost purely index-matching investment strategy, it manages over 95 percent of its investment portfolio 
                                                          
16 Dixon and Monk (2013) and Al-Kharusi, Dixon and Monk (2014) also describe why many SWFs in distant (from 
major financial centers) regions might choose to set up satellite offices in financial centers or establish formal ties 
with asset managers located therein. Dixon and Monk note that many SWFs have grown disillusioned with paying 
high fees for mediocre returns; in their delicious phrase(page 42), “they [SWFs] were, and in most cases still are, 
paying for alpha but only receiving beta returns.”    
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in-house (through Norges Bank Investment Management, or NBIM), whereas ADIA farms out over two-
thirds of its total portfolio to external management.   
The second key implication of the fact that even large SWFs have small professional staffs is that 
these funds cannot play any important direct corporate governance role in the companies in which they 
invest. At any point in time, Norway’s GPFG owns stock in over 8,000 companies, so it is unable to 
assign staff to sit on corporate boards or interact individually with investee firm managers—even if it 
wished to do so. Other funds, which do not spread their equity investments as broadly as GPFG, can 
sometimes assign staff to sit on the boards of a few large investee firms, but almost always in domestic 
rather than foreign companies. Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2010) find that SWFs acquire seats in 
only 53 of 355 cases (14.9%) where director identities of investment targets could be verified, and most 
of these were domestic companies. Even in those cases, the funds are much more likely to nominate an 
employee of a fund subsidiary company than from the parent fund itself. 
2.2. Widely Varying Transparency Measures and Recent Changes 
SWFs have long fascinated corporate governance researchers, since their rise to global 
prominence brought forth a unique new class of major international investors: state-owned investment 
funds with massive capital bases, with demonstrated tastes for purchasing listed shares across borders, 
and with no real need to make liquid investments. Various measures of the transparency and internal 
corporate governance of SWFs have been suggested, but two have been embraced universally enough to 
be considered standards. The first measure is the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, which was 
developed by Carl Linaburg and Michael Maduell and is used by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
(Maduell is the SWFI’s founder and current CEO). The second measure is the SWF Scoreboard, 
popularly called “Truman Scores” after Edwin Truman (2008, 2011), who defined and popularized the 
Scoreboard.  
The two measures are quite similar in stressing how transparent the funds are with respect to their 
internal organization, the amount of information they disclose about fund investments, and their political 
distance from the host/sponsoring government. In constructing the index, Truman (2011) links together 
the following elements into four categories: “(1) structure of the fund, including its objectives, links to the 
government’s fiscal policy, and whether the fund is independent from the countries’ international 
reserves; (2) governance of the fund, including the roles of the government, the board of the fund and its 
managers, and whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate responsibility; (3) accountability and 
transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, investment activities, reporting, and audits; and (4) 
behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and its risk management policies, including the use of 
leverage and derivatives” (http://www.iie.com/publications/briefs/truman4983.pdf). The maximum 
possible Truman score is 100 and the highest score assigned in 2011 (the last year available) is 96, for 
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Norway’s GPFG. The lowest assigned score is 15, for both Istithmar World and the Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA).  
Truman added another transparency/governance measure after 2008—how well individual SWFs 
complied with the “Santiago Principles” agreed to in September of that year by members of the 
International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds at an IMF-sponsored conference in Chile 
(http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm). This working group evolved into the International 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Forum, and includes the largest SWFs, as well as 25 host and sponsor countries. 
As with the Truman scores, the maximum “Santiago Principles” value is 100 and Norway’s GPFG 
received a 96 score in 2011, while Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) came in last with a score of 15. 
The Linaburg-Maduell Index (http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/linaburg-maduell-
transparency-index/) is based on “ten essential principles that depict sovereign wealth fund transparency 
to the public.” A value of either zero (absent) or one (present) is assigned for each essential principle for 
each fund, so the best score attainable is 10. The SWF Institute (sponsors and publishers of the index) 
recommends that a fund must have a minimum value of 8 to be considered adequately transparent, and 24 
of the 53 SWFs to which the Institute assigns an Index value in April 2014 have scores of 8 or higher. 
Ten funds have Index values of 10, while six have Index values of only 1. Table 3 summarizes the most 
recent Linaburg-Maduell and Truman scores for 25 of the largest SWFs. We complement these fund 
scores with two measures of transparency and economic freedom for the countries that sponsor the funds, 
the Transparency International 2013 Corruption Perception Index and the Heritage Foundation’s 2014 
Economic Freedom Index. As the name implies, the Corruption Perception Index measures how honest, 
transparent and corruption-free a country is perceived to be, while the Economic Freedom Index 
essentially measures how “capitalist” a country is, or how closely that nation’s economy approximates a 
free market.  
**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
Much of what can be deduced from studying Table 2 will be unsurprising. In general, democratic 
countries such as Norway, New Zealand, Ireland, Australia, and Canada rank very highly on the 
Corruption Perception Index, and their SWFs rank equally highly on the SWF Scoreboard and Linaburg-
Maduell Index. Likewise, relatively non-transparent societies such as Kuwait, China, the United Arab 
Emirates, Russia, Oman, and Brunei rank quite low on the Corruption Perception Index, while the SWFs 
they sponsor rank similarly low on the transparency indices. Countries that are both transparent and free 
market-oriented (that rank high on the Economic Freedom Index)—such as New Zealand, the United 
States, Ireland, Australia, and Canada—also have very good Corruption Perception scores and their funds 
rank near the top in terms of transparency. On the other hand, countries with closed or state-dominated 
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economies (Kuwait, UAE, China, Russia, Malaysia, Brunei) score poorly on both the national and the 
fund-specific indices.  
But there are also surprises imbedded in Table 3’s data. Singapore ranks as one of the world’s 
least corrupt and most open countries, but its two main funds, Temasek and GIC, rank mid-range at best 
on the SWF Scoreboard measure (Truman score) and GIC ranks in the bottom half of Linaburg-Maduell 
Index scores with a value of 6. Korea also ranks fairly high (upper-quartile) on the national measures of 
corruption and economic freedom measures, but Korea Investment Corporation has an unimpressive SWF 
Scoreboard value of 60, though it scores higher (9) on the Linaburg-Maduell Index. However, the greatest 
surprises of all involve how two countries, East Timor and Azerbaijan, with quite poor (generally bottom 
quartile) national scores for both corruption perception and economic freedom have been able to establish 
SWFs that have SWF Scoreboard values of 85 and 76 and Linaburg-Maduell Index values of 8 and 10, 
respectively. These contradictory findings demonstrate that a particular fund’s level of operational and 
disclosure transparency need not be a mechanical reflection of the openness or free-market orientation of 
the sponsoring nation. Instead, sponsoring countries can establish funds that are either more or less 
transparent than the society from which they emerged and for which they act as fiduciaries.  
2.3. How Do SWFs Differ from Other Large, Internationally Active Institutional Investors  
As discussed in the introduction, the key question regarding SWFs is whether they truly differ in 
form, motive, and effect from other large, internationally active institutional investors. In many ways, this 
question cuts across this survey and is reprised in each section. For example, an analysis of SWF portfolio 
allocations requires a private-sector comparison group, as in Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), who 
compare SWFs to pension funds, and Avendaño and Santiso (2012), who compare SWFs to mutual funds; 
a discussion of the impact of SWFs on the behavior and governance of investment targets requires a 
private-sector benchmark, as in Karolyi and Liao (2011), or Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2014). 
Yet, we would like to briefly summarize here the main characteristics that make SWFs truly 
distinct and that carry important implications of potential interest to academic observers. In this respect, 
the defining characteristic of SWFs is their state ownership. On the positive side, in terms of social 
welfare, governments could have broader goals than simple wealth maximization at the firm level—for 
example, the maximization of employment levels and promotion of broad national industrial interests. On 
the negative side, politicians might distort priorities through their rent-seeking influence and because they 
impose on enterprises multiple, perhaps conflicting objectives. As state-owned actors, SWFs might suffer 
from such deviations from the set of objectives normally associated with private-sector investors, and this, 
in turn, might translate political influence onto their investment targets. In this sense, SWFs investments 
suffer from the same problems of “multiple principals” and cognitive dissonance described in the “mixed 
ownership” by Boardman and Vining (2012) and Vining, Boardman, and Moore (2014). Yet, while many 
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other examples of mixed ownership result in opaque entities, SWFs often apply mixed ownership to 
publicly traded, and hence transparent, firms allowing for a more data-rich investigation of the impact and 
efficiency of government investments. Whether this mixed ownership, as Vining, Boardman and Moore 
(2014) put it, results in the “best of both worlds”—merging government’s concern for social welfare to 
private sector efficiency—or in the “worst of both worlds” (crony capitalism) is one of the lessons we can 
draw by investigating the impact of SWFs on their investment targets.   
Second, SWFs, with rare exceptions, have no explicit liabilities—unlike, for example, heavily 
levered hedge funds or pension funds that have to budget for periodic cash outflows. In this sense, they 
have the potential to be true long-term shareholders, with very long investment horizons and very low 
liquidity requirements, possibly the most effective monitors as in Chen, Harford, and Li (2007). Of 
course, whether that potential is realized or hampered by low staffing levels, political objectives, and a 
mistrust of a foreign government as a shareholder is a matter of empirical inquiry.  
 
3. Conclusions  
 
The research published so far has led to some important lessons. First of all, though large, SWFs 
should not be frightening. Their assets under management, at $4.5 trillion, while large in absolute terms, 
are still only a small fraction of the total value of financial assets worldwide, estimated at $212 trillion. 
Further, while commentators often point out that SWFs are much larger than most hedge funds, they often 
fail to note that SWFs are dwarfed by banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies. Also, SWFs are 
often too politically constrained to be a serious financial threat, mostly due to the geopolitical goals of 
their governments that, far from pushing for influence abroad, often constrain their activities. Finally, 
SWFs are not only operationally and financially similar to other institutional investors, but often behave 
like big, passive pools of capitals (what cynics might call “big, dumb capital”) due to low levels of 
internal staffing—or, as in the case of Norway, due to an explicit investment strategy aimed precisely at 
preventing undue influence and the resulting foreign backlash. 
A second lesson emerging from this literature is that SWFs are not homogeneous—and should 
not be treated as such. Norway’s GPFG stands apart, not just as the largest SWF, but also as the most 
transparent and diversified fund. GPFG has emerged as a true alternative to the “Yale Model” of 
endowment fund management, by limiting its investments to small stakes in a large number of firms 
diversified in both geography and industry. Qatar’s fund, on the other hand, is the champion of a much 
more active role of SWFs, making fewer, large and visible investments both in equities and, even more, in 
iconic real-estate deals—and even playing the part of the deal-maker, as in the recent Glencore 
acquisition of Xstrata. Yet, to gain insight into SWF behavior, we should not be fooled by this 
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heterogeneity, as SWFs are not idiosyncratic either; certain systemic differences can be identified and 
used to classify them into distinct groups. SWFs differ principally on funding source—with commodity-
based funds on one side, clustering geographically around the Gulf area and trade-imbalance funds more 
common in East Asia—and on sponsor-country characteristics. While many funds originate from non-
democratic regimes, there are big exceptions as well. Finally, we find substantial differences in 
transparency levels.  
Third, while it would be naïve not to recognize that SWFs are state-owned entities that often 
make politicized capital allocations, we need to be mindful of the fact that no evidence exists, to date, of 
political interference in the behavior of the foreign targets in which SWFs invest. Of course, the same 
cannot be said for their domestic investments—but it is the foreign actions of these state-owned vehicles 
that trigger most fearful responses. Accordingly, while we recognize the need to keep monitoring and 
studying the behavior of these state-owned investment vehicles in foreign markets, the evidence to date 
does not justify the protectionist response that so many commentators and politicians have been 
advocating.  
In some sense, SWFs are a “second best” organizational form as fiduciaries. As state-owned 
entities, they are constrained in their ability to invest abroad and to improve the governance of their 
investment targets through active monitoring, as other institutional investors have been shown to do. 
Small, under-motivated staffs, often associated with state-owned institutions, frequently compound the 
lack of activity induced by those constraints. As a result, while no definite statements can be made due to 
the distinctive lack of transparency of SWFs, what data is available indicates that private funds out-
perform SWFs across the board in their investments. Extant research has amply shown that state 
ownership leads to a dramatic deterioration in efficiency, as SOEs are often managed by teams that are 
either under-motivated and “captured,” at best, or incompetent and corrupt at worst. SWFs, when properly 
organized, can insulate investment targets from political oversight and influence and, in this way, mitigate 
some of the problems that plague SOEs. In some sense, a properly structured SWF—and Norway is the 
model, with its management team well insulated (but, even then, not completely insulated) from political 
pressures—is a hybrid structure, allowing for government ownership without government management. 
In societies in which the state plays a dominant economic role, SWFs might be the only real, feasible 
alternative to full governmental control. 
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Figure 1. Total Foreign Exchange Reserves, World and Country Groupings, US$ Billions, 1984-2011  
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD). [2012 total $12.336 trillion] 
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Table 1. Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Sovereign Investment Lab SWF Transaction Database  
 
This table lists the 33 funds that meet the Sovereign Investment Laboratory definition of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), and offers information regarding country of origin; 
fund name; the year in which the fund was established; the principal source of funding for the fund; and estimated total assets under management in US$ billions as of 
March 17, 2014.  
 
Country Fund Name Inception Year Source of Funds Total Assets US$ Billion 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global  1997 Commodity (Oil) $840.8 
UAE-Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976 Commodity (Oil) 773.0 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Foreign Assets 1963 Commodity (Oil) 663.3 
China China Investment Corporation 2007 Trade Surplus 575.2 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 1953 Commodity (Oil) 410.0 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  1981 Trade Surplus 285.0 
Russia National Wealth Fund and Reserve Fund  2006 Commodity (Oil) 174.6 
Singapore Temasek Holdings  1974 Trade Surplus 173.3 
China National Social Security Fund 2000 Trade Surplus 141.4 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 1974 Government-Linked Firms 115.0 
Australia Australian Future Fund 2006 Non-Commodity 87.6 
UAE-Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 2006 Commodity (Oil) 70.0 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 1983 Commodity (Oil) 68.9 
UAE-Dubai International Petroleum Investment Company  1984 Commodity (Oil) 63.5 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 2003 Commodity (Oil) 60.0 
Republic of  Korea Korea Investment Corporation  2006 Government-Linked Comps 56.6 
UAE-Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company PJSC  1993 Commodity (Oil) 55.5 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 1983 Commodity (Oil) 40.0 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan 1999 Commodity (Oil) 35.8 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Berhard  2000 Government-Linked Firms 31.7 
Ireland National Pension Reserve Fund 2001 Non-Commodity 27.7 
New Zealand New Zealand Superannuation Fund 2001 Non-Commodity 20.2 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 2005 Commodity (Oil & Gas) 14.6 
UAE-Dubai Isthitmar World 2003 Government-Linked Firms 11.5 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 2006 Government-Linked Firms 10.9 
UAE Emirates Investment Authority 2007 Commodity (Oil) 10.0 
UAE-Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council 2005 Commodity (Oil) 10.0 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 1980 Commodity (Oil & Gas) 8.2 
UAE-Ras Al Khaimah Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority 2005 Government-Linked Firms 2.0 
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 2005 Government-Linked Firms 0.6 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 1956 Commodity (Phosphates) 0.5 
São Tomé & Principe National Oil Account 2004 Commodity (Oil) 0.00063 
Oman Oman Investment Fund 2006 Commodity (Oil & Gas) Unknown 
Total, 18 oil-based funds (US$ billion) $3,298.2   
Total, 15 non-oil based funds (US$ billion) $1,539.2   
Total, all 33 funds (US$ billion) $4,837.4   
 
† Sovereign Investment Laboratory estimate of assets under management (AUM). 
* Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings) estimate of assets under management (AUM) as of March 17, 2014. 
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Table 2. Transparency, Economic Freedom, and Governance Scores for Fund-Sponsor Countries and Sovereign Wealth Funds 
This tables details the Transparency International 2013 Corruption Perception Index (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results) value [maximum = 100] and global 
rank [lowest = 175] and Heritage Foundation 2014 Economic Freedom Index (http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking?src=home) value [maximum = 100] and global 
rank [lowest = 179] for countries that sponsor major sovereign wealth funds, plus the funds names and assets under management values and corresponding SWF 
Scoreboard values from Truman (2011) and the Linaburg-Maduell Index values from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Index (http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings). 
 
Country Information and Scores Fund Information and Scores 
 
Country 
2013 Corruption 
Perception Index 
Value (Rank) 
2013 Economic 
Freedom Index 
Value (Rank) 
 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Name Fund Assets, US$ Billion 
SWF 
Scoreboard 
Linaburg-
Maduell Index 
Norway 86 (5) 70.9 (32) Government Pension Fund – Global $840.8 97 10 
New Zealand 91 (2) 81.2 (5) New Zealand Superannuation Fund 20.2 94 10 
United States 73 (18) 75.5 (12) Alaska Permanent Fund 49.5† 92 10 
Ireland 72 (21) 76.2 (9) National Pension Reserve Fund 27.7 86 10 
East Timor 30 (119) 43.3 (169) Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 14.6 85 8 
Australia 81 (9) 82.0 (3) Australian Future Fund 87.6 80 10 
Azerbaijan 28 (127) 58.9 (169) State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan 35.8 76 10 
Canada 81 (9) 80.2 (6) Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 16.4† 74 9 
Singapore 86 (5) 89.4 (2) Temasek Holdings 173.3 73 10 
Chile 71 (22) 78.7 (7) Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 15.2† 71 10 
Kazakhstan 26 (140) 63.7 (67) National Fund 68.9 65 8 
Singapore 86 (5) 89.4 (2) Government Investment Corporation 285.0 65 6 
Kuwait 43 (69) 62.3 (76) Kuwait Investment Authority 410.0 63 6 
Republic of  Korea 55 (46) 71.2 (31) Korea Investment Corporation 56.6 60 9 
UAE-Abu Dhabi 69 (26) 71.4 (28) Mubadala Development Company PJSC 55.5 59 10 
UAE-Abu Dhabi 69 (26) 71.4 (28) Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 773.0† 58 5 
China 40 (80) 52.5 (137) China Investment Corporation 575.2 57 7 
Russia 28 (127) 51.9 (140) National Wealth Fund and Reserve Fund 174.6 50 5 
Malaysia 50 (50) 69.6 (37) Khazanah Nasional Berhard 31.7 44 5 
Bahrain 48 (57) 75.1 (13) Mumtalakat Holding Company 10.9 30 9 
UAE-Dubai 69 (26) 71.4 (28) International Petroleum Investment Company 63.5 26 9 
Oman 47 (61) 67.4 (48) State General Reserve Fund 8.2 26 1 
Brunei 60 (38) 69.0 (40) Brunei Investment Agency 40.0 21 1 
UAE- Dubai 69 (26) 71.4 (28) Investment Company of Dubai 70† 21 4 
Qatar 68 (28) 71.2 (30) Qatar Investment Authority 115.0 15 5 
UAE-Dubai 69 (26) 71.4 (28) Istithmar World   11.5 15 NR 
† Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Index (http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings) 
 
